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CHAPTER EIGHT 
 
GOVERNING THE BODY:  
THE LEGAL, ADMINISTRATIVE AND DISCURSIVE CONTROL OF THE 
PSYCHIATRIC PATIENT 
 
Paul Taylor 
 
Whilst much of our life-span may appear domestic in nature, occasionally our lives are 
punctuated with either the direct experience of, or presentation of imagery that highlights 
dramatic, unusual and potentially harmful activities or behaviours.  In fact, our individual 
risk of harm is likely to be much greater than one necessarily assumes on a day-to-day basis, 
for example, travelling in a motor vehicle or eating a high calorie meal.  Yet the rational 
construction of these risks are undertaken on a frequent, almost continuous basis and as 
individuals we develop our own frameworks of logic that make judgments over the benefits 
and potential harms of participating in a particular activity. 
 These lay judgments of risk are a naturally occurring phenomenon, but are shaped by 
an individual’s understanding of what that particular risk may be.  Lay judgments are often 
influenced by professional and scientific knowledge in addition to personal experience and 
influence from key institutions such as the media, government officials and experts.  The 
virtues of avoiding a set of circumstances or altering behaviours that minimises potential 
harms are propounded and often can be observed to have legislative underpinnings (for 
example, public tobacco smoking restrictions in England and seat belt enforcement for 
motor vehicles).  Enforcement strategies such as these govern a majority in society and may 
be intrinsic elements of agendas and discourses such as health promotion and health and 
safety.  Such approaches to risk management have quickly become part of the cultural make-
up of society, understandable of course in the context of a humanitarian concern for the 
health of society and public safety. 
 Mitigating risk is nothing new, and one particular area of risk management that has 
evolved has been in the area of crime control and the minimisation of harm to the public.  A 
preventative logic has pervaded many institutions responsible for providing public 
protection.  Of course, there have been failures and reviews of such failures have 
strengthened the resolve of specific institutions to think differently about their chosen 
approach.  Criminal justice has not been alone in its attempts to mitigate the risks of 
criminality in society, rather psychiatry as a profession has had a key function in this process 
too.  A medico-legal alignment has characterised an abundance of approaches to the social 
deviant, for example, the rise of forensic psychiatry and the physical presence of institutions 
designed specifically for the mentally disordered who have committed criminal offences or 
are deemed at risk of doing so (Mercer and Mason, 1998). 
 Psychiatry’s function of preventing harm to others is just part of their mandate; it must 
also be acknowledged that it serves to prevent harm to the person themselves.  Several 
scholars (see Kjellin and Nilstun, 2007 for an overview of the literature in this area) have 
termed this as medical paternalism, a process whereby the liberties of the individual are 
restricted so that medical interventions can be administered.  This process takes place 
largely under the auspices of welfare and can frequently involve coercion and physical 
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restrictions being placed on the body (such as hospital detention under the Mental Health 
Act 1983 amended 2007).  Whilst such approaches may be regarded as motivated by 
therapeutic concern this outlook may not be shared by those individuals who are subject of 
its interventions (Breeze, 1998).  The justifications for limiting individual liberty therefore 
come under scrutiny, however, aggregated medical knowledge, coupled with official 
systems such as the Mental Health Act, serve to shape understandings of appropriate and 
inappropriate social conduct. 
 Libertarian, John Stuart Mill’s (1859) On Liberty provides some illumination that for the 
state, or one of its agencies to become involved in prohibiting behaviours they must 
maintain a cautious approach.  Mill’s (1859) Harm Principle adopts a stance whereby self-
regarding actions (actions which may only impact on the individual themselves) should not 
be interfered with.  Mill positions this statement within a framework of responsibility, 
suggesting that social actors can free themselves from coercion of society or the state, only 
through a process whereby they become responsible and accountable for their actions.  The 
outcomes for those who are consistently sanctioned by authority structures and legislation, 
in the view of Mill, are potentially grave, causing a situation whereby individuals ‘neither 
obtain their fair share of happiness, nor grow up to the mental, moral, and aesthetic stature 
of which their nature is capable’ (Mill, 1869 cited in D’Agostino, 1982, p. 319).  For the 
psychiatric patient, the issue of responsibility is complex, as psychiatric knowledge has the 
capability to assert and suggest that individuals falling under particular diagnostic criteria 
may lack mental capacity, cannot make ‘informed decisions’ or in the judicial process, may 
be convicted of an offence on the grounds of ‘diminished responsibility’. 
 Scholars emerging from the ‘anti’ and ‘critical’ psychiatry perspectives would argue that 
the coercive capabilities of the profession (for example, restrictions and controls over the 
body, mind and behaviours) take place under a veil of welfare and humanitarian concern.  A 
discursive wrangling thus ensues with competing perspectives on the limits of legitimate 
state intervention to control the lives of others.  Psychiatry’s main opponents conceive that 
there is an over-use of preventative strategies.  In these circumstances, the actual harm is not 
easily identifiable, neither is the victim (either self or others).  The coercive and preventative 
approach that psychiatry readily uses, from a critical standpoint, does not emulate a liberal 
axiom of tolerance that Mill’s original theorisations would support (see Levenson, 1986 for 
further ethical analyses of this). 
 Paternalism that is exercised by the state and its institutions takes place on many fronts 
and the author acknowledges that clinicians and practitioners undertake their work in the 
context of professional judgments and decision-making based on their individual and 
collective expertise.  Furthermore, it is not the intention here to undermine the valuable 
work of the psychiatric profession, what this chapter aims to highlight is the significance of 
psychiatry’s role in social control and participation in defining discourses and the meaning 
of risk. 
 
The Politics of Risk and Risk Management 
The way in which risk is imagined is fluid and dynamic and there is a prevailing cultural 
preoccupation with its management in what has been coined broadly as the ‘risk society’ 
(Beck, 1992; Giddens, 1999).  Insurances against risk are commonplace and take a variety of 
forms, for example, the welfare state (Giddens, 1999).  Particular to crime control, risk has 
become institutionalised and individuals who pose the most risk to the majority have 
increasingly been defined as the dangerous.  The injurious effects of this have potential to be 
enduring; yet assumptions are typically based upon subjective judgments. McGuire (2004 
cited in Hewitt, 2008, p. 187) raises concern that ‘socially constructed facts and conceptual 
uncertainties, which inform public perception of risk, may correspond only loosely to the 
threats posed in reality’.  The presence of risk requires individuals and society’s institutions 
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to risk manage their actions and therefore a risk aversion mentality becomes enshrined in 
the legislative/policy structure that governs society. 
 Control of situations or individuals that threaten the social milieu is undertaken 
systematically and as Lyon (2001) suggests, by virtue, a risk society is a surveillance society.  
Crime and danger are central to how risk may be conceived or understood; however it is 
only with a knowledge of the extent of crime, for example, that the true extent of the risk can 
be contemplated. Fear of crime is influential in the shaping of policy, legislation and public 
opinion on this subject, indeed, Jupp, Davies and Francis (2003, p. 144) suggest that ‘there 
was no fear of crime in Britain until it was discovered in 1982’ following innovations in 
publicly accessible crime surveys.  Through these processes of attention and social and 
political reaction, particular types of offender, for example, the sex offender, violent offender 
and the mentally disordered offender occupy a particular position in the social psyche in 
which they are typified in a hierarchy of those who have a propensity to cause the most 
devastating and long-lasting harm or injury.  The measures put in place to insure against 
these potential threats, and the news reporting of them shape their construction and identity 
and they become a ‘major source of fear and anxiety’ (Greer, 2003, p. 1). 
 Pre-occupation with the avoidance of harm therefore becomes impressed upon the lives 
of all citizens and the risk estimations serve to make the ‘future become ever more 
absorbing, but at the same time opaque’ (Giddens, 1999, p. 4).  For the state, surveillance and 
control hold the key to circumnavigating social threats, however, as Rose (1998, p. 179) 
notes, ‘the task for psychiatric professionals is now less therapeutic than administrative: 
administering problematic persons on a complex terrain in an attempt to control their future 
conduct’. 
 Systems of monitoring and control of the psychiatric patient in the less-restrictive 
context of the community have had a problematic history.  The removal of the physical or 
material systems of control (for example the hospital building) in favour of pharmaceutical 
control and visitations (for example, depot injections and community-based practitioners), 
psychiatry and politics have experienced the uncomfortable apologies of responding to 
society where things have gone wrong.  The rhetoric association of dangerousness, risk and 
mental disorder has advanced at a significant pace, not least during the early 1990s.  The 
murder of Jonathan Zito at a tube station in London in December 1992 by Christopher 
Clunis sparked fury and opened the debate on the abilities of health and allied services to 
manage those diagnosed with mental disorder in the community.  This tragedy was marked 
by systematic failures in the continuity and supervision of Clunis, having contact with over 
thirty psychiatrists and ten inpatient episodes for the assessment and treatment of a 
psychotic illness prior to Zito’s murder (Coid, 1994).  A report into the circumstances 
surrounding these events concluded that opportunities had been missed by health 
professionals (Ritchie, Dick and Lingham, 1994) and called for revised and robust measures 
for supervision in the community. 
 Parliamentary responses to the perceived crisis of dangerousness in society amounted 
to a rapid addition to the MHA (1983).  Section 25a MHA (1983) ‘Supervised Discharge’ was 
introduced under the Mental Health Act (Patients in the Community) (1995) in a move to 
counteract Health Secretary Frank Dobson’s concerns that ‘too many vulnerable patients 
were being left to cope on their own, creating a danger to themselves and the public’ 
(Dobson, 1998 cited in Warden, 1998, p. 1611).  The public protection agenda became centre 
stage with a number of calls to adopt a process of re-institutionalisation.  By this time, risk 
and dangerousness was firmly aligned with the diagnosis of mental disorder, and 
catastrophic failures in supervision had a ‘profound effect on public confidence in mental 
health services’ (Burns and Priebe, 1999, p. 191), overshadowing the medical advancements 
of this era. 
 
Corporeality: The Body and Society 
Risk Mitigation and Mental Health Policy 
With its origins in the nineteenth century, Mental Health Act legislation has seen several 
revisions, the latest being enacted in 2007.  Monitoring of psychiatric treatment has been 
undertaken in a variety of formats for a number of centuries, such as parliamentary 
commissions and independent agencies.  The Mental Health Act Commission was 
established under the Mental Health Act 1983, and recently this commission has become 
assimilated into a broader agency known as the Care Quality Commission (CQC).  The CQC 
functions to evaluate how care and treatment is delivered set against governmental policies.  
They make routine and unannounced inspections and engage with service users to 
determine the quality of care being provided.  
 In the context of mental health care, the CQC has already begun to synthesise findings 
over the recently revised Mental Health Act in 2007.  The CQC report ‘Monitoring the use of 
the Mental Health Act in 2009/10’ has unveiled a number of fundamental issues and 
concerns over the recently amended Mental Health Act (MHA). During this twelve-month 
review, the CQC has observed that the MHA has been used more than it ever has been 
before.  The CQC (2010, p. 8) reports that ‘over the last decade, there has been a steady 
decline in the overall number of people treated as inpatients in mental health hospitals’.  
Despite this however, the number of people detained under the MHA has remained at 
around 45,000 people per annum (In 2009/10 there were 45,755 detentions).  Furthermore, 
the CQC (2010) draws attention towards an increase in the number of detained service users 
residing in low secure care environments. 
 These statistics apply to both National Health Service (NHS) and private sector 
treatment environments.  Disturbingly, and in addition to the figures presented above, the 
CQC reports feedback from patients that ‘hospital life is becoming much more focused on 
rules and security’ (CQC, 2010, p. 11) with particular reference to locked inpatient mental 
health wards catering for both informal and detained service users.  The CQC findings also 
raise concern outside of the boundaries of institutional care.  Caution has further been raised 
over the introduction of the Community Treatment Order (CTO) and has been identified as 
providing opportunity for a broad use of coercive power (CQC, 2010).  These findings are 
perhaps unsurprising for some in light of recent developments in the national field of mental 
health.  This discipline has undergone radical shifts in policy, economic investment and 
legislation and is likely to see further major reforms into the second decade of the twenty-
first century under developing government proposals.  
 Receiving Crown assent in 2007, the new Mental Health Act illustrates a considerable 
revisionist approach to psychiatry’s compulsory powers.  Capacity, autonomy and the role 
of compulsion in the assessment and treatment of the individual have been just some of the 
areas attracting critical debate.  The Richardson Committee and later the Richardson Report 
(Department of Health, 1999a) undertook an evaluation of the reforms necessary to develop 
modernised mental health legislation.  In its analysis, the Richardson Report (1999a, p. 6) 
remarked that ‘the Committee is convinced that the notion of capacity has an independent 
value and meaning the core of which is accepted by all those involved in the operation of 
mental health legislation’.  For the Richardson Committee, a focus on the individual’s 
capacity to consent to treatment is indicative of an attention towards the best interests of the 
person.  Further, placing capacity at the heart of legislation would, it was hoped, regulate 
the boundaries of compulsory admission and treatment.  The Government’s consultation 
paper based on the Richardson Committee’s recommendations published the following 
concerns over its own expert panel’s comments: 
 
The principal concern about this approach [Richardson Report’s recommendation on 
capacity as a central component of legislation] is that it introduces a notion of capacity, 
which, in practice, may not be relevant to the final decision on whether a patient should be 
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made subject to a compulsory order.  It is the degree of risk that patients with mental 
disorder pose, to themselves or others, that is crucial to this decision.  In the presence of 
such risk, questions of capacity – while still relevant to the plan of care and treatment – 
may be largely irrelevant to the question of whether or not a compulsory order should be 
made. 
(Department of Health, 1999b, p. 32, emphasis added) 
 
As Zigmond (2001) explains, such analyses of risk rather than capacity taints decisions that 
are made surrounding compulsion under the Act, specifically that these decisions are not 
necessarily medical ones, rather they are prescriptive demands on risk minimisation 
amounting to a ‘Public Protection Order’.  
The most recent Mental Health Act has also incorporated two overarching changes; an 
abolition of the four categories of mental disorder in favour of a broader definition of mental 
disorder and, a test of ‘appropriate medical treatment’ being available introduced.  It is this 
second aspect that has raised some concerns within academic and professional circles.  The 
MHA 1983 made the clinician undertaking the Mental Health Act assessment responsible for 
evaluating whether the mental health condition was treatable.  If so, and the individual was 
unwilling to enter hospital informally, then compulsion could be used.  Within the MHA 
2007, this ‘treatability test’ has been replaced with a statement that allows for the use of 
compulsion under the Act conditional that there is ‘appropriate treatment available’.  
Although a small alteration, this has led to concerns that compulsion may be over-used as 
the threshold for detention has now been substantially lowered.  
 Such amendments and a lowering of compulsion thresholds may have the potential to 
increase hospital occupancy in line with cultural understandings of what constitutes a risky 
individual or the fear of blame being asserted should the wrong decision be made.  A case 
that has featured as an area of significant deliberation is that of the diagnosis of personality 
disorder (PD).  Compulsory hospitalisation of individuals suffering with a PD, a diagnosis 
first included under MHA 1959, has raised some disquiet from within professional groups 
over the legitimacy of detention, questioning the ability of the psychiatric profession to 
provide adequate treatment for this particular condition (see Sarkar, 2002) for an overview 
of the literature).  Without some level of common agreement within the psychiatric 
profession on the ability to treat PD (and therefore whether they have capacity to consent to 
treatment or not) the situation remains problematic.  Attention to risk, ambiguity and 
disagreement over treatability, and the perception of a lowered compulsion threshold have 
been regarded, by some, as components of a piece of legislation that is profoundly 
paternalistic, authoritarian and stigmatizing (Mental Health Alliance, 2007).  As Prins (2008, 
p. 84) posits there is an ‘over-emphasis on the use of the law in changing behaviour’ and 
through amendments to the MHA, many more people may be subject to its sanctions and 
capabilities. 
 
Regulating Meaning: The ‘New’ Dangerousness 
Institutions in society, such as the medical profession have been considered to have the 
capability to represent and regulate meaning (Cohen, 1985).  Apprehension has been raised 
about the possible consequences of this, not least where these meanings pertain to those who 
may threaten the social milieu.  Criminal justice and psychiatry may be observed to be 
implicit in this process, and theorists draw attention towards the widening of a net of 
control (Cohen, 1985).  Examples of this concept in practice can be detected in criminal 
justice policy where penal populism has been seen to take an effective hold with the 
promotion of legislation and policy which are electorally attractive, but unfair, ineffective or 
at odds with a true reading of public opinion (Bottoms, 1995).  Elsewhere, psychiatry has 
attracted similar criticism for its newly adopted broad definition of mental disorder, 
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removal of a treatability test and introduction of community treatment orders under the new 
MHA (Prins, 2008; Mental Health Alliance, 2007).  
 Failures in the supervision of patients and offender-patients in the community during 
the last decade of the twentieth century have galvanised new methodologies for the 
management of risk in the community.  This was not something particular to psychiatry, but 
rather an approach mirrored by others involved under the rubric of public safety and crime 
control.  The risk management agenda in criminal justice had adopted intolerance to liberal 
measures of managing offenders.  The Criminal Justice Act (2003) represented a move 
towards the use of a prediction and estimation, becoming central to how the offender was 
processed by the criminal justice system.  The introduction of indeterminate sentences for 
public protection (IPP) and the formalising of multi-agency public protection arrangements 
(MAPPA) under this piece of legislation embedded a cautionary principle in the 
management of those defined as ‘dangerous offenders’ (s.224–236 CJA, 2003).  Despite the 
arbitrary and multiple meanings of the term ‘dangerousness’, its usage has become implicit 
in recent legislation such as s.229 of the CJA (2003): 
  
s.229 The assessment of dangerousness 
(1) This section applies where— 
(a) a person has been convicted of a specified offence, and 
(b) it falls to a court to assess under any of sections 225 to 228 whether there is a significant 
risk to members of the public of serious harm occasioned by the commission by him of 
further such offences. 
(Criminal Justice Act 2003) 
 
The rhetoric of risk and dangerousness now pervades boundaries of criminal justice and 
mental health policy with annual summaries such as the National Confidential Inquiry into 
Suicide and Homicide providing illustrations of the extent of this issue.  Sixty-five 
convictions for homicide were recorded in 2006 perpetrated by individuals who had 
received psychiatric treatment in the twelve months prior to the offence (against a total of 
539 homicides in the general population) (Appleby, Kapur and Shaw, 2010).  Such statistical 
evidence raises a number of questions within professional circles as to how these figures can 
be reduced and what methods can be adopted to achieve it. 
 Statute law, empirical evidence and the developing remit of ‘control professions’ 
reinforce these new sensibilities surrounding risk and dangerousness, however new 
definitions present significant problems in negotiating balance between individual liberty 
and security.  The prevailing discourses of security, protection and risk management have 
generated an anxiety over a number of decades.  The ‘anti’ and ‘critical’ psychiatry 
movements have raised concern that such systems provide opportunities for some 
individuals (for example, professionals) to self-actualise whilst life chances of others 
(patients) are restricted (Castel, 1991).  It has been widely theorised that psychiatry itself has 
fought to construct its own integrity at the cost of those subject to it (Foucault, 1967; Scull, 
1979) whilst others have gone further to suggest that mental illness is socially constructed 
and used to categorise those who deviate from the dominant norms of society (Szasz, 1961). 
 Whilst the process of planning reforms for the MHA was being undertaken, 
simultaneously, revisions were being made to address further risk posed by the mentally 
disordered.  During the late 1990s, proposals were being drawn up to accommodate what 
was to be defined as a new kind of ‘dangerous offender’.  These New Labour proposals were 
illustrative of a politics with a priority on public protection.  The brutal murder of Dr Lin 
Russell and her six-year old daughter Megan, and attempted murder of nine-year old Josie 
by Michael Stone in July 1996 provided a significant bolstering to these new proposals.  It 
had emerged that prior to the murders, Stone had been detained for assessment under the 
MHA (1983) and had been diagnosed with a personality disorder.  However he was 
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assessed as having mental capacity and subsequently released from hospital.  As Rutherford 
(2006, p. 55) explains, ‘the authors of these new proposals accepted that the status quo was 
unacceptable’.  Public safety appeared to be in jeopardy from a preying risk of individuals 
who had slipped through the net of criminal justice and health agencies.  The Dangerous 
Severe Personality Disorder (DSPD) proposals of the early late 1990s were viewed as a 
remedy to such heinous crimes being perpetrated in the future. 
 Cultivating a new MHA that would support DSPD proposals was problematic and 
remained an area of contention, not least in the concerns of the ability to treat this condition, 
with some asserting that a personality disorder is very different from a mental illness 
because ‘it is essentially a developmental disorder’ (Eastman, 2000 cited in Seddon, 2008, p. 
29).  Over the course of ten years, the DSPD programme evolved and amounted to around 
three hundred beds across four units (two based in prisons and two based in High Secure 
Hospitals) that accommodate those risk assessed and assimilated into this category.  As 
Rutherford (2006) indicates, DSPD proposals have become illustrative of a leading example 
of a much wider change in criminal justice agendas.  
 Evaluative analysis by Tyrer et al (2010) of the DSPD programme has been largely 
inconclusive in terms of establishing clear programme successes to support future economic 
investment in this initiative or its ethical base.  This review of the programme draws 
attention towards the heavy financial implications associated with detaining individuals in 
this way and also the questionable practices where ‘many prisoners are moved into the 
DSPD programme very close to the time at which their sentence tariff is about to end’ (Tyrer, 
et al, 2010, p. 97).  Scepticism over the cost effectiveness of the DSPD programme has most 
recently been seen in the Response to the Offender Personality Disorder Consultation 
(Department of Health, 2011) whereby the UK government plans to decommission the NHS 
DSPD units and to re-shape the services, interventions and treatments for offenders with 
severe personality disorder (SPD) within the prison estate. 
 As an example, the DSPD programme and the developed attention towards personality 
disorder highlight a favouring of psychiatry to remedy forms of social deviance and a 
degree of therapeutic optimism in how identified conditions can be addressed.  However, 
they also examples illustrate the tenuous balance between security and liberty.  The aura of 
risky populations has become the zeitgeist.  As a society, and through the structural and 
administrative responses implemented by politics and the state, England and Wales are 
fearful of risk itself.  Whilst the imagery of Brady and Sutcliffe were once the faces of the 
dangerous offender with mental disorder, these have been replaced by the facelessness of 
interventions and resurgence in purpose-built facilities of containment. 
 
Control Beyond Incarceration 
The CQC (2010) reports that, in a relatively short period of time, reformed legislation 
appears to have given way to greater use of coercive (formal treatment under the MHA) 
mental health treatment.  Whilst a wholesale return to Victorian asylumdom (Scull, 1993; 
Morrall and Hazelton, 2000) may not be evident, regimes of security, actuarial discourses, 
incapacitation and arguably ‘warehousing’ are pronounced and evident in modern 
psychiatry (O’Malley, 2004).  Psychiatry has long operated its own systems of bifurcation 
(Cohen, 1985).  Ranging from community supervision to hospitalisation, the current 
tendency appears to favour institutionalisation as the preferred methodology, most 
noticeable in an expansion in formally detained inpatients, a growth in low secure provision 
(CQC, 2010).  In common with crime control agendas, psychiatry has become increasingly 
involved as a defensive agent (Hotopf et al., 2000) and implicit in the security and risk 
discourses that pervade society.    
 Whilst formal hospitalisation may be on the increase, community supervision has also 
received legislative attention through revisions to the MHA.  Supervised Community 
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Treatment (SCT) has been emphasised with the introduction of the Community Treatment 
Order (CTO), a replacement of s.25a–25j (supervised discharge) of the MHA (1983).  The 
CTO provides authority to the responsible clinician to recall a patient back to hospital 
subject to them being liable to be detained under s.3 of the MHA.  These measures are 
viewed by the profession as a competent method to reduce the likelihood of deterioration in 
the mental wellbeing of an individual by minimising the risk of harm to themselves or 
others through swift hospitalisation (Mind, 2011). 
 However, much like other amendments contained in the revised MHA, the introduction 
of the CTO has sparked controversy.  Speaking in the House of Lords debates in 2007, 
Conservative Shadow Minister for Health Earl Howe raised his concerns about the 
consequences of the CTO being enacted.  Drawing from concerns already raised by the 
Mental Health Act Commission, Howe referred to the addition of the CTO in MHA 
legislation as the introduction of the ‘psychiatric ASBO’ (Howe, 2007).  Despite these 
frustrations and concerns with plans contained within the Mental Health Bill (2006) to 
validate more stringent community supervision, the CTO has maintained its position on 
statute and has become an increasingly used addition to psychiatry’s repertoire of sanctions.  
 In the first full year of the revised MHA, in England 4,107 CTOs were made (CQC, 2010, 
p. 96).  Despite this, the efficacy of the CTO has come under scrutiny in a review of their 
usage internationally.  A Cochrane Review of CTOs established that where used, 
compulsory community treatment offered ‘no significant difference in health service use, 
social functioning or quality of life compared with standard care’ (Kisely, Campbell and 
Preston, 2011, p. 2).  Whilst the efficacy of the CTO is being challenged, the CQC has also 
explored how they are used.  In a review of 208 reports analysed by the CQC (2010) three 
alarming themes emerged.  Firstly, one third of the sample was receiving medication for 
their mental health condition above the advisory limits of the British National Formulary.  
Secondly, whilst the CQC note the difficulties of obtaining accurate statistical data in this 
area, they report that in the sample analysed, there was evidence of a disproportionate use 
of the CTO amongst black and ethnic minority groups.  Lastly, the CQC report that one third 
of their sample placed on a CTO has no reported history of non-compliance or 
disengagement with treatment. 
 Given the data presented by the CQC, the legitimacy of the use of the CTO is 
questionable.  The veil of risk prevention, actuarial practices and surveillance has emerged 
from the radical revisionist approach to mental health law.  Psychiatry has re-established 
and intensified its position as a key agent in the control and regulation of the meaning of 
risk and dangerousness.  Failures in supervision of the past haunt policies of the present 
where ‘the reality is that community care is a makeshift policy of competing pressures for 
control’ (McCann, 1998, p. 60).  Whilst such policies and interventions may address human 
suffering and limit the potential for harm, as is evident from this CQC report, it is only now 
that some indication is available of the broad approaches and coercive powers of a discipline 
that is professionally somewhat distanced from the criminal justice system, yet has an equal 
ability to apply an array of sanctions legitimised through its self-regulating authority over 
the right to treat the treatable and attempt to treat the untreatable. 
 
Conclusions 
The revisions to the MHA and associated policy and programme developments in the field 
of psychiatry have developed a situation of a systematic growth in diagnosis and detention.  
Social deviance is increasingly becoming medicalised and psychiatry is required to engage 
with a broader mandate.  Medical paternalism has a firm hold and assessment and 
treatment are not solely located within the ambition to treat; rather psychiatry must adhere 
to broader approaches to the social deviant and prevailing discourses of risk management 
and physical controls.  The modern psychiatric treatment environment has therefore become 
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part of a broad ‘expurgatory system’ (Mathiesen, 2006, p. 141) designed to provide 
accommodation and arrangements for those in society who are problematised or diagnosed.  
Diagnosis is therefore a tool and as such any person who is diagnosed is subject to further 
assessment in terms of risk discourses and in some cases may identify them as 
unmanageable.  In such cases further systems to ensure public safety are imposed in a bid to 
provide insurances against potential breaches of wider society’s security (Corbett and 
Westwood, 2005). 
 The encompassing framework of psychiatry, diagnosis and the removal of a treatability 
test in the new MHA provide, in the view of some, a panacea for the regulation of society.  
They are symbolic of new strategies for crime control and social obedience.  Arguably 
psychiatry has become an agent or tool of crime control, more so than being strictly a 
rehabilitative endeavour.  Risk has become institutionalised within governing agencies and 
disciplines but has also been internalised by society’s citizens.  The MHA (2007) and CJA 
(2003) both serve to illustrate conceptually similar objectives despite emerging from 
ideologically opposed worlds (therapy versus punishment).  In response to the prevalence of 
risk discourses, governments see the need to ‘qualify their claim to be the primary and 
effective provider of security and crime control’ (Garland, 1996, p. 449).  Such an 
achievement is problematised by high profile failures and harm perpetrated by a minority.  
However, a predicament emerges, where new categorizations and new aggregated identities 
of the dangerous shape the sensibilities of policies to control them and the general public 
who are supposedly protected by the sanctions imposed. 
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